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Status of This Memo 
This document provides information to the Grid community on issues which grid applications may 
have when dealing with firewalls. It does not define any standards or technical recommendations. 
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Abstract 
Several kinds of network devices like Firewalls are used to protect an institutional network against 
malicious attacks from the public Internet. This document enumerates and illustrates a selected 
set of grid scenarios that encounter some issues when dealing with firewall types of devices. The 
knowledge and experience gathered through these use-cases is utilized to classify the issues into 
homogeneous categories that can be used by grid application developers and management 
personnel as guidance. These categories will be used to propose new or recommend existing 
academic and/or standards based solutions to the grid community.   
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1 Introduction 
 
Grid-Projects with external partners lead to communication relationships between external and 
internal computer systems often requiring special configurations at firewall systems. These 
configurations include:  
• allowing access for communication sessions (ports) 
• allowing access to single systems or whole sub networks 
Additionally physical access may be provided by implementing dedicated high-performance 
physical or logical links as fiber, wavelength, sub wavelength, VPN, VLAN, etc. Assuming that 
external sources cannot gain access and misuse these links they are rarely secured by firewalls. 
Because of the limitations of today’s firewalls (often limited to 1 Gb/s throughput, some products 
already offering 10 Gb/s) load balancing by means of multiple firewalls is often based on IP or 
MAC-address balancing, i.e. one stream will be executed by one firewall giving real balancing 
only with multiple communication streams. Grid applications with huge bandwidth demands (one 
single data stream) do not benefit from these types of firewalls. Some firewall clusters implement 
round-robin mechanisms, but they are limited to lower throughput because of the extreme 
overhead needed for status information updates between the different firewall components. 
Only few firewall systems are able to handle applications with dynamically assigned ports. Some 
implementations exist for applications such as FTP, H.323, and SIP. But currently no general 
solution is available; support for protocols used by Grid applications may not be expected in near 
future either. 
Often within a grid environment each institution or even worse each installation has its own 
firewall system. All of them have to be traversed by Grid applications. Because of the problems 
discussed above, project networks are placed in a demilitarized zone in most of the cases. This 
implies that every computer system used in the project has to be secured carefully. Wrongly 
configured systems lead to immediate security vulnerabilities. 
Supercomputers or special systems may be connected via dedicated networks assuming a “Net 
of Trust”, i.e. users at these systems will be trusted leading to insider security problem. 
Compromise of these systems leads to increased security problems.  
Finally the situation shown above result in: 
• administrative overhead for deployment and protection of grid environments 
• wildcard access rights (ports not known, so access granted to whole system) 
• weaker policies or no security policies anymore 
• general decreasing security level to that of the partner installation 
• security vulnerability because of open ports for long time periods.  
 
The examples above show there are new demands on today’s firewalls. Many national and 
international activities/projects try to cope with these problems. Some of them are: 
• D-Grid, a German project funded by BMBF, Germany, work package FG3-5, “Design and 
deployment of firewall concepts within grid environments, Performance and dynamic 
configuration” (see: http://www.d-grid.de)  
• MIDCOM (see: IETF Internet draft “Middlebox Communication: Framework and 
Requirements” at http://sip-router.org/info/players/ietf/firewall/midcom/draft-kuthan-fcp-
02.txt) 
• University of Buffalo, Grid Computing Research projects, ACDC-Grid Firewall - 
„Advanced Computational Data Center Dynamic Firewall (ACDC Dyna-Fire) 
Development“ (see: https://grid.ccr.buffalo.edu/research/) 
 
This document tries to identify typical scenarios of today’s grid environments. It structures these 
scenarios into use cases and classifies these cases into general communication concepts used 
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by grid applications. These classifications provide a fundament for further investigation into 
possible solutions that will be discussed within a later FI-RG document.  
The solutions examined so far can be divided into three categories: 
1. Solutions that do not require any modification or additional software/hardware 
development (e.g. give access to a special port) 
2. Solutions through development of new software/hardware components, which allow 
handling of special use cases or classes of use cases (e.g. as it’s done for the ftp 
protocol by checking the control channel and opening the ports negotiated between the 
communication partners via the control connection). 
3. No solution is achievable with the current types of firewalls. New software/hardware 
models have to be developed. 
 
The current document tries to pave the way to these classifications, to identify which of the 
current grid applications fall into which category and how to deal with use cases which are 
categorized into categories 2 and 3 above. 
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2 Definitions 
 
The goal of this chapter is to provide an overview of the types of devices and software 
components that are used to protect grid applications and infrastructures from malicious attacks 
from the Internet. 
 
2.1 Firewall  
A firewall is a logical object (hardware and/or software) within a network infrastructure which 
prevents communications forbidden by the security policy of an organization from taking place, 
analogous to the function of firewalls in building construction. Often a firewall is also referred to as 
a packet filter. 
 
The basic task of a firewall is to control traffic between different zones of trust and/or 
administrative authorities. Typical zones of trust include the Internet (a zone with no trust) and an 
internal network (a zone with high trust). The ultimate goal is to provide controlled connectivity 
between zones of differing trust levels through the enforcement of a security policy and a 
connectivity model based on the least privilege principle. 
 
Proper configuration of firewalls demands skill from the administrator. It requires considerable 
understanding of network protocols and of computer security. Small mistakes can lead to a 
firewall configuration worthless as a security tool and, in extreme situations, fake security where 
no security at all is left. 
 
 
2.1.1 Classification of firewalls 
There are three basic criteria to categorize firewalls:  
1. whether the communication occurs between a single host and a network, or between two 
or more networks; 
2. whether the communication is intercepted at the network layer or at the application layer; 
3. whether the communication status is tracked at the firewall or not.  
 
With regard to the position of a firewall in the network layout there are: 
• host firewalls, i.e. software applications which filter traffic entering or leaving a single 
computer; 
• network firewalls, i.e. software normally running on a dedicated network device or 
computer positioned on the boundary between two or more networks or DMZs 
(demilitarized zones). Such a firewall filters all traffic entering or leaving the connected 
networks.  
 
The latter definition corresponds to the conventional, traditional meaning of "firewall" in 
networking. Additionally, firewalls may be located between administrative domains of an 
organization (e.g. between production, research, administration and finance departments). 
 
In reference to the software layer where the traffic is intercepted, three main types of firewalls 
exist: 
• network layer firewalls  
• application layer firewalls  
• application firewalls  
 
The network-layer and application-layer types of firewalls may partially overlap. Indeed there are 
examples of single systems that implement both of them together. 
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Application firewalls are sometimes used in wide area networks (WAN) to govern the access to 
the system software. An extended description would place them at a lower level than application-
layer firewalls, actually at the operating system layer, and thus they could otherwise be called 
operating system firewalls. 
 
Lastly, depending on whether the firewalls track communication status, two categories of firewalls 
exist: 
• stateful firewalls  
• stateless firewalls  
 
2.1.1.1 Network layer firewalls 
Network layer firewalls operate at a (relatively low) level of the TCP/IP protocol stack as IP-packet 
filters, denying packets to pass through the firewall unless they match one positive filtering rule.  
The firewall administrator defines the rules or default built-in rules are applied (as in some 
inflexible firewall systems). A more permissive setup could allow packets to pass the filter as long 
as they do not match one "negative rule" or "deny rule".  
 
Today network firewalls are included into most computer operating systems and network 
appliances. 
 
2.1.1.2 Application-layer firewalls 
Application-layer firewalls work at the application level of the TCP/IP stack and intercept all 
packets traveling to or from an application (HTTP traffic, telnet traffic, ftp traffic, etc.). They block 
packets, which do not conform to the application’s network protocol, usually dropping them 
without acknowledgement to the sender. In principle, application-layer firewalls can stop all 
unwanted incoming traffic from reaching protected machines. 
 
By inspecting all packets for improper content, these firewalls can even prevent the spread of 
viruses. In practice, however, this task becomes so complex and so difficult to attempt (given the 
variety of applications and the diversity of content each of them may allow in its packet traffic) that 
comprehensive firewall design does not generally attempt this approach.  
 
The XML Firewall exemplifies a recent kind of application-layer firewall. 
 
2.1.1.3 Application firewalls 
The term application firewalls is often used to describe security tools that control access to 
special services that run on an operating system. They are composed of software components 
securing the local system by checking which external (remote) hosts may access the services 
running on this node. Often these firewalls are called operating system firewalls.  
 
A well-known implementation of application firewalls is TCP wrapper. 
 
2.1.1.4 Stateful/stateless firewalls  
Modern network-layer firewalls can filter traffic based on many packet attributes like source IP, 
source port, destination IP or port, destination service like WWW or FTP. They can filter based on 
protocols, TTL values, netblock of originator, domain name of the source, and many other 
attributes.  
 
Having the ability to look into the packets in more detail, allows monitoring the status of the 
transmission (based on TCP options or simulated status for stateless protocols) and 
implementing more complex filtering rules. A stateful firewall usually allows incoming TCP 
packets only when they belong to a connection started by a host in the protected network. 
Connection requests coming from untrusted networks are rejected. 
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In contrast to this behavior a stateless firewall does not monitor the status of connections. Every 
packet has to be checked and mapped to a rule that either allows or denies it. 
 
2.2 Firewall (global definition) 
In a broader sense a firewall is the implementation of an institution’s security policy concerning 
traffic exchange between different security domains. It is not only a black box or a single 
hardware component. It can be much more. It is the set of all rules to be enforced for secure 
communication. It is the way to check the compliance with these rules and it is the whole 
collection of software and hardware used to implement this mission.  
 
2.3 Network Address translators  
Network Address Translation (NAT) [RFC 1631] provides a way to map IP addresses from one IP 
network to another IP network allowing transparent routing between client and server hosts in 
distinct networks. Transparent in this context describes the possibility of mapping IP addresses 
without explicit interaction or knowledge of the user. In this sense NAT is transparent to the user. 
In the simplest case, a user behind a NAT initiating a single simple message, this translation 
within the IP header does not lead to any problems within the transaction. But often IP addresses 
are overloaded with security issues, e.g. access rights, user authentication and last but not least 
authorization. In this scenario NAT may become a problem, especially as often configured, when 
mapping is done dynamically. NAT in general is not a security mechanism, but nevertheless 
introduced additional barriers against intruders. It hides the internal network to external hackers.  
 
NAT is often applied to connect private networks, using private address spaces, to the external 
Internet with officially registered addresses. Using this technique it is possible to temporarily solve 
the current shortage of official IP addresses by recycling them for different hosts until new IP 
addresses (IPv6) become available and commonly deployed. Address translation is normally 
done at the borders of private domains; this particular modus operandi makes this technique 
appealing also for security reason. The main advantage of NAT is that it can be enabled without 
any changes to routers or hosts. Unfortunately NAT cannot be used in conjunction with all 
existing applications since some services encode IP addresses in the packet payload. In these 
cases NAT must co-exist with application level gateways (ALGs, see below). 
 
Allowing transparent routing, NAT devices modify host addresses in the packets on the fly and 
maintain state information of communication flows. Packets belonging to the same 
communication stream have to be translated in the same manner, i.e. to the same IP address.  
 
Port Address Translation (PAT) or Network Address Port Translation (NAPT) [RFC 2663] 
enhances this technique. Here different hosts are mapped to the same IP address, using port 
information (source and destination port) to differentiate between different streams of 
communication (e.g. TCP and UDP port numbers, ICMP query identifiers). Many internal private 
IP addresses can be translated to one single official external IP address.  
 
Often NAT and PAT are used as a security mechanism. Internal hosts are allowed to setup 
communication paths to external hosts, but connections from external hosts to internal hosts can 
be setup only if a translation is currently active (i.e. an internal host has already setup a 
connection). Here NAT is done dynamically, making it harder for an attacker to target any specific 
host in the NAT domain. NAT routers may be used in conjunction with firewalls to filter unwanted 
traffic. Often the firewall itself offers the NAT functionality. 
 
Problems arise with end-to-end IPsec, because this protocol does not allow the presence of NAT 
devices in the communication path. IPsec encodes the source and destination addresses of the 
end-to-end communication. If NAT changes one of these addresses the IPsec module will detect 
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it and the communication will fail. A possible solution is to use NAT devices as end-points of the 
IPsec tunnel. 
 
“NAT devices, when combined with ALGs, can ensure that the datagrams injected into Internet 
have no private addresses in headers or payload. Applications that do not meet these 
requirements may be dropped using firewall filters. For this reason, it is not uncommon to find 
NAT, ALG and firewall functions co-exist to provide security at the borders of a private network. 
NAT gateways can be used as tunnel end points to provide secure VPN transport of packet data 
across an external network domain. (RFC 2663)”  
 
2.4 Application level gateways  
Not all applications lend themselves easily to translation by NAT devices, especially those 
applications that encode IP addresses and port numbers in the payload. In these cases, 
Application Level Gateways (ALGs) play a very important role. ALGs are application-specific 
translation agents that transparently allow an application running on a host in one address realm 
to connect to its counterpart running on a host in a different realm. ALGs may interact with NAT to 
set up state, use NAT state information, modify application specific payload and perform 
whatever else is necessary to get the application running across disparate address realms. 
 
ALGs may not always utilize NAT state information. They may glean application payloads and 
simply notify NAT to add additional state information in some cases. ALGs are similar to proxies, 
in that both ALGs and proxies facilitate application specific communication between clients and 
servers. Proxies use a special protocol to communicate with proxy clients and relay client data to 
servers and vice versa. Unlike proxies, ALGs do not use a special protocol to communicate with 
application clients and do not require changes to application clients. 
 
In the context of firewalls application level gateways are used to open up pinholes into the 
firewall. Both kinds of usage introduce some major problems into the organizations security 
policy. First of all by rewriting payload, the message content will be changed which breaks 
message authentication. The receiver cannot check anymore if the real message (data) part has 
been modified by a third party. Additionally they force firewall vendors to support a bunch of 
application protocol stacks on their firewalls, which is expensive, time consuming (processing and 
throughput) and increases exposure to implementation errors. 
 
Nevertheless there are grid scenarios, in which ALG cannot be avoided to establish the required 
communication paths of particularly projects. 
 
2.5 VPN gateways 
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) gateway can be considered as the "employee entrance" into a 
corporate network, whereas a firewall could be considered as the "public entrance".  A corporate 
network is typically classified as a private network, created to support the business of an 
Enterprise, SMB, or any other organization with a need to protect its networked resources from 
public access. A VPN gateway uses credentials issued by the Corporate Network Administrator to 
create a security association between the corporate VPN gateway and a remote VPN site. 
Remote sites can either be individual PC clients or other VPN gateways. A remote VPN gateway 
allows the corporate network to be securely extended into a branch office via an insecure 
network. This setup is called a site-to-site VPN. A PC VPN client allows an individual employee to 
access the corporate network from the Internet when at home or traveling. Protocols, such as 
IPsec, L2TP, PP2P and SOCKS ensure authenticated and encrypted communication between 
VPN sites by creating a tunnel. On such connections, packets are constructed in a specific VPN 
protocol format and are encapsulated within some other base or carrier protocol, then transmitted 
between VPN client and server, and finally de-encapsulated on the receiving side. The base 
protocol for Internet is IP. Other cases, which typically rely on point-to-point connections, may use 
layer 2 protocols. 
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Most VPN gateways offer functionalities similar to firewalls; packet filtering and packet inspection 
are examples. It is therefore important to consider these types of devices within the scope of this 
document. 
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3  Grid applications and their issues with firewalls 
This chapter contains input from various organizations describing their issues with firewalls. This 
input may describe problems and suggested solutions. When contributions were asked, no 
structure was suggested as to keep the input as broad as possible. The information within this 
section will be analyzed and classified in subsequent sections.  
 
3.1 Middlewares and Protocols 
3.1.1 The Globus Toolkit 
Organization: Research Center Jülich GmbH, Jülich, Germany 
The Globus Toolkit homepage (see: http://www.globus.org/toolkit/) welcomes the user with the 
following introduction: 
“The Globus Toolkit® is an open source software toolkit used for building grids. It is being 
developed by the Globus Alliance and many others all over the world. A growing number 
of projects and companies are using the Globus Toolkit to unlock the potential of grids for 
their cause.” 
 
Designed as a toolkit and developed by many participants it has gone through various steps of 
programming versions, which led to different security solutions throughout the design process. 
The toolkit allows users to start compute jobs, request status information and cancel jobs, transfer 
data between grid resources and manipulate their availability and access criteria.  
 
Because of its widespread deployment it is extremely worthy to examine which protocols have to 
be enabled and/or which ports have to be opened at the local firewalls, to allow the Globus 
Toolkit to be used at local sites. A very detailed description concerning firewall requirements for 
the different Globus Toolkit components has been given by Von Welch in the “Globus Toolkit 
Firewall Requirements” document  
(see: http://www.globus.org/toolkit/security/firewalls/Globus%20Firewall%20Requirements-7.pdf).  
Globus differentiates between Grid Service ports, Ephemeral ports and Controllable Ephemeral 
ports. A grid service port is a static, single, port defined for a very specific grid service 
(comparable with ftp, ssh or http ports). An ephemeral port is a port that will be dynamically 
assigned by the system during program execution. A controllable ephemeral port is a special 
case of ephemeral ports that can be configured to be within a predefined port range.  
 
Depending on the Globus application used, different communication scenarios can be identified. 
These different kinds of communication streams vary in the complexity of the firewall 
configurations required at the server and client sides. Communications can be initiated: 
1. from an ephemeral port on the client to a grid service port on the server; 
2. from a controllable ephemeral port on the client to a grid service port on the server;  
3. from a controllable ephemeral port on client to a controllable ephemeral port on the 
server. 
 
The first group corresponds to connection to standard services. The server firewall must allow 
connections from remote arbitrary ports to local static ports. The client firewall must allow 
connections from local arbitrary ports to remote static ports. 
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The second group corresponds also to standard service communication, the only difference being 
the arbitrary port used by the client (controllable ephemeral port) lies within a small subrange of 
ports. The server firewall must allow connections from remote arbitrary ports to local static ports. 
The client firewall must allow connections from local range of arbitrary ports to remote static 
ports. 
 
The third group is the most complex one. First of all, any installation may define its own port 
ranges, with ranges differing from server to server (when several servers are in place). As a result 
the complete list of access rules for the firewall becomes quite complicated. The server firewall 
must allow connections from remote arbitrary ports to local ranges of arbitrary ports. The client 
firewall must allow connections from local range of arbitrary ports to remote arbitrary ports. For 
some services the magnitude of the port range depends on the number of parallel sessions 
initiated. Additionally these port ranges are opened outside of the well-known port range (0-1024), 
allowing unprivileged applications to use these ports too.  
 
From the use cases point of view the Globus Toolkit behaves as most other applications 
discussed so far. Some Globus applications can be handled securely in a standard way of firewall 
configuration. Others need techniques which, implemented securely and automatically 
manageable, are not available yet. 
 
3.1.2 UNICORE 
Organization: Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, Jülich, Germany 
The UNICORE software (UNiform Interface to COmputing Resources, is a software interface 
which allows easy and uniform access to distributed computing resources, and which provides 
support for running scientific and engineering applications in a Grid environment (see also: 
UNICORE – The seamless Grid solution, http://unicore.org). Scientists can use different 
supercomputers as well as other computing and storage resources without having to become 
experts in the special kind of access software and security policies of the various (super-) 
computer centers. 
 
UNICORE provides a science and engineering Grid combining resources of supercomputer 
centers. It makes these resources available through the Internet. UNICORE uses a strong 
authentication and authorization scheme in a consistent and transparent manner. Differences 
between platforms are hidden from the user. A seamless HPC portal for accessing 
supercomputers, compiling and running applications, and transferring input/output data has been 
developed. 
 
Through using UNICORE end-users can concentrate onto their real application issues and 
therefore increase their productivity. Internal supercomputer specifics are hidden to these end-
users who don’t need to learn any kind of job control languages.  
 
The UNICORE user prepares or modifies structured jobs through a graphical client interface on 
his local workstation or PC. Besides the UNICORE internal job description UNICORE also is able 
to handle XML-Jobs. After preparation the created job has to be submitted to one of the platforms 
of a UNICORE Grid. Here the user may monitor and control the submitted jobs through a second 
area in the UNICORE client.  
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Figure 7: Job preparation: Definition of a job, adding dependencies and resource requests. 
  
UNICORE allows to structure jobs, dividing them into independent tasks. Dependencies between 
these tasks can be assigned. The structured model allows executing a job, divided into subtasks 
to be run on different locations of the UNICORE Grid leading to hierarchical job structures and 
data locations. So UNICORE is able to manage complex multi-site and multi-step workflows 
efficiently. 
 
UNICORE has a three tier architecture which consists of the Client, the Gateway, and the NJS 
/TSI. The NJS (Network Job Supervisor) is responsible for mapping the abstract job description to 
concrete target system issues. This is done with the IDB (Incarnation Database). For mapping, it 
also authorizes the user to access the target system. The NJS is the front-end to the target 
system. The TSI (Target System Interface) is a library of Perl modules installed on the target 
system (e.g. the supercomputer) itself and providing an interface between the batch system and 
the UNICORE servers. Because all UNICORE components, except the TSI, are implemented in 
Java, the UNICORE Client and servers are very platform independent. 
 
UNICORE tasks and resources are represented in abstract terms and units, so that a server can 
translate them into the platform-specific commands and options. Input and output files are 
automatically imported/exported from/to the user's file space or transferred from earlier tasks of 
the same job. Explicit transfer tasks handle the high-speed data transfer between different sites. 
The UNICORE servers select the most efficient mechanism for each transfer.  
 
GFD-I.083  August 16, 2006 
fi-rg@ogf.org  14 
For each job, the user specifies the intended target system and the task's resource requirements. 
The client software checks whether the resources requests by the end-user can be satisfied by 
the target system, and submits the job into the target system. To resubmit a job at a different 
system, the user simply changes the target system.  
 
 
 
Figure 8: Job monitoring: inspect the status of running jobs and retrieve the output 
 
In any case, the users can monitor and control their jobs through the job monitor interface, which 
depicts the job status graphically.. After job execution the output data of the job can be retrieved 
to the local workstation  
 
User authentication is performed using X.509 certificates. Each UNICORE user has a personal 
user certificate signed by a trusted CA. The administrator himself is responsible to define the 
“Trusted CAs” in the UNICORE servers. Each job the user sends into the UNICORE Grid is 
signed by the private key of the certificate.  User authorization is handled by the participating sites 
using their proven mechanisms. In this case UNICORE also completely retains the sites 
autonomy with authorizing users and allocating resources to them. The UNICORE interface for 
the user authorization is called UUDB (UNICORE User Database). This component maps the 
user’s public key of his personal certificate to the real Xlogin on the target system. So every time 
a job arrives in the UNICORE Grid the certificate is checked and compared with the entry in the 
UUDB. Only if both are identical will the job be transferred to the target system. To transfer jobs, 
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control information and application data, SSL is used to guarantee data integrity and 
confidentiality. The signing of job representations with the originating user's private key also 
prevents third parties from tampering with the job contents.  
 
The UNICORE gateway component authenticates connection requests by checking if the 
incoming certificate is signed by a trusted CA. The Gateway also checks that the presented 
user’s certificate has not been revoked and is still valid. The gateway can cooperate with firewalls 
to permit only legitimate UNICORE traffic. It may reside outside the protected zone, in a 
demilitarized zone, or within the protected zone depending on the site's security setup. Using 
UNICORE only one port for the gateway has to be opened in the firewall.  
 
While the Client-Gateway connection must be SSL-secured, the connection between Gateway 
and NJS can be optionally SSL-secured. The UNICORE NJS is generally located in the safe 
intranet; nevertheless it might be necessary or wished by the site’s administrators to secure the 
Gateway-NJS connection via SSL as well. This is also one example of how UNICORE does not 
influence the sites autonomy. Since both the Gateway and the NJS component are provided with 
a server certificate, the SSL handshake can be established between those components, too.  
 
 
Figure 9: UNICORE architecture: system components and their interaction 
 
The UNICORE client enables the user to create, submit and control jobs from any workstation or 
PC on the Internet. Only an installed UNICORE client is required. All user certificates are stored 
in the UNICORE client keystore. So the user might just export this keystore to e.g. a memory 
stick and import it on another machine and he is able to access all his jobs and resources again. 
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The client connects to a UNICORE gateway, which authenticates both users and other UNICORE 
servers, before contacting the UNICORE NJS, which in turn manages the submitted UNICORE 
jobs. NJS incarnates abstract tasks destined for local hosts in batch jobs and run them on the 
native batch subsystem. Tasks to be run at a remote site are transferred to a peer UNICORE 
gateway. All necessary data transfers and synchronizations are performed by the servers. They 
also retain status information and job output, passing them to the client upon user request.  
 
The protocol between the components is defined in terms of Java objects. A low-level layer called 
the UNICORE Protocol Layer (UPL) handles authentication, SSL communication and transfer of 
data as inlined byte-streams and a high-level layer (the Abstract Job Object or AJO class library) 
contains the classes to define UNICORE jobs, tasks and resource requests.  
 
Third-party components can be integrated into the system: on top of UPL to create alternatives to 
the AJO layer, or within the AJO layer defining new classes. Thus, the functionality of clients and 
servers can be extended within the UNICORE framework by implementing so called Plug-ins. 
Plug-ins are also Java objects which allow integrating different applications into the UNICORE 
Grid software easily.  
 
3.1.3 Web services Firewall Issues 
Organization: Argonne National Laboratory, ANL, US 
As the web service protocol will most probably be used for the control channels and control-
planes that manage GridFTP endpoints and/or dynamic firewall configurations, it is important to 
understand the issues and the associated requirements. 
 
3.1.3.1 Internal vs. External EPRs 
The application service’s EPR (End Point Reference) has an address that is used as the network 
endpoint for that service by the clients. As a result, when a service is located behind a firewall, 
external clients (i.e. outside the corporate firewall) cannot use the same EPR that is used by the 
internal clients. If the access by external clients is allowed through an application-layer firewall, 
then the external clients will have to be supplied with an external-EPR for the application service 
that will direct the clients to send their messages to the SOAP-Proxy service that, after policy 
enforcement, will forward the requests to the application service behind the firewall. 
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Figure 10: External Clients and Internal EPRs 
 
The issue is depicted in Figure 10, where the external client’s use of the application service’s 
internal-EPR is blocked by the firewall, while the external-EPR is shown to route the external 
client’s messages through the proxy service to the application service. 
 
We have no standardized ways yet to: 
• Augment the EPR with routing information 
• Obtain an external EPR from an internal one 
• Publish and discover the need for external EPRs 
• Express policies to tell clients to extend the security context end-to-end  
 
3.1.3.2 Ephemeral Internal EPRs 
Even if we have a way to tell the external client that a soap-proxy service should be used to 
connect to the internal application service, we have an additional issue with factory-like patterns. 
 
In a factory-pattern, a service is used to obtain a new EPR for a newly created or located 
resource. In other words, an EPR for that new service is returned in the message exchange with 
the factory service. 
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Figure 11: External Clients and Ephemeral EPRs 
 
As shown in Figure 11, the issue with the returned EPRs is that by default they will be internal 
EPRs, and they should somehow be translated to external EPRs before the external client is able 
to use them. 
 
The issues with ephemeral EPRs are: 
• We have no standardized way for the firewall to discover which internal EPRs should be 
translated on the fly into external ones (feels like HTML rewriting for reverse-
webproxies…) 
• We have no way to express and enforce a policy that allows firewalls to deal with 
ephemeral EPRs, which may refer to a resource that is not in the same hosting 
environment as the factory, or not even on the same host, and may not even use the 
same identity credentials. 
 
3.2 Data Transfer and Storage 
3.2.1 GridFTP versus the Firewall 
Organization: Argonne National Laboratory, ANL, US 
GridFTP is a fairly troublesome application from the point of view of firewalls.  It can use a 
significant number of ports that are in the ephemeral range and with today’s protocols it is 
impossible neither to know in advance the full 5 tuple that describes a connection, nor to limit the 
usage to two ports. 
 
GridFTP, like FTP, has two channels, a control channel and a data channel.  The control channel 
is relatively painless.  It is always a single socket connection to a well-known port.  The 
connection is strongly authenticated, it is encrypted, integrity protected, and requires very low 
bandwidth, so this is something that firewall administrators are generally willing to deal with, and 
because of its low bandwidth, the firewall generally does not introduce any performance 
limitations. 
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The troublesome part of GridFTP is the data.  Why is it so difficult?  There are several reasons.  
First, the data channel is a logical construct and can consist of an arbitrary number of sockets, 
which can vary in time.  The protocol allows sockets to be added or removed arbitrarily anytime 
during a transfer.  Second, the protocol requires that the sending sides perform the TCP connect 
so you do not have the option of having the client be passive to work around firewall restrictions.  
Third, the full 5-tuple for a given connection is known very late in the process and nothing has 
global knowledge of the connections between individual sockets that make up the logical data 
channel. 
 
Some background on how GridFTP works will help explain this. We will describe a third party 
transfer (a transfer between two servers mediated by the client).  It is the most complex of the 
transfers and client/server transfers simply do only one half of the PASV/PORT command, since 
the client knows the other half internally when it is involved in the actual movement of data.  We 
will describe a striped transfer, which involves m hosts on one end sending to n hosts on the 
other end. m and n are not required to be equal and can be one, this is a non-striped transfer for 
the purposes of this discussion, i.e. a striped transfer with m and n equal to one.  
 
The client attempts to open a control channel connection on a well-known port.  Assuming this 
port is open on the firewall and it can establish a connection, it begins sending a series of 
commands that do authentication, and then begin to describe the transfer, like is it binary or 
ASCII, etc. If this server is the receiving server, it will send the SPAS (striped passive) command.  
Each host at the receiving side will then listen on a set of arbitrary ephemeral ports, and the list of 
listening ports is sent back to the client in the response to the SPAS command.  At this point that 
server knows it will be contacted, but it does not know by whom. 
 
The client now attempts to open a control channel to the sending server again on a well-known 
port.  It authenticates and begins its command sequence to the server, but this time it will send 
the SPOR (striped PORT) command.  This command includes the list of listening ports that was 
returned in the response to the SPAS command.  This tells the server that it *MAY* connect to 
this list of servers.  It may connect to one, all, or some subset depending on the layout of the 
data.  It does not yet know how many connections to make.  That is determined when the OPTS 
RETR (retrieve options) command is sent.  This indicates the minimum number of streams, the 
start number of streams, and the maximum number of streams.  Note that it is the sending server 
that can decide to change the number of streams, within the limits specified, the client can not tell 
the server to add or remove streams; this means that there is no command sequence that can be 
trapped on the control channel to know when a new connection is being initiated.  Once the 
RETR <filename> command is received, each host on the server side will determine which hosts 
in the SPOR list it needs to connect to and will initiate the connection, which will again be an 
arbitrary ephemeral port.  It is only in the socket call when the connecting ephemeral port is 
chosen that the full 5-tuple is known. 
 
The problem, that not only one single data port can be used, is that you can only have one 
process using a port.  The way the control channel works is that some daemon (typically inetd) is 
listening on the well-known port.  It gets a *single* connection, does a fork/exec, duplicates the 
socket, hands it off to a new process and then closes it’s file descriptor.  It is now ready to accept 
another connection on that port from anywhere other than a host and port that already has a 
connection to its port 2811. 
 
However, let’s assume that we wanted to have 2812 be the data channel port.  The process 
listening on that port would need to be able to accept a connection, know which transfer that 
connection is associated with, and how many total connections were expected (all connections 
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would have to be formed up front, this would not allow for additional connections later, a limitation 
of what the protocol allows, though probably not a big one).  Once it had all the connections for a 
given transfer, it could then fork/exec a data node (GridFTP backend) dup all the necessary 
sockets to it, then it closes its socket, and that backend could go merrily upon its way.  The 
problem is that there is no way, today, to know what transfer a connection is associated with and 
no way for that listener to know how many connections it should get. 
 
3.2.2 Impact of dCache deployment 
Organization: Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, Jülich, Germany 
dCache is a joint venture between the Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron (DESY) and the Fermi 
National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab). dCache has been selected as a data storage solution 
to be used in the German D-Grid project started in 2005.  
 
dCache allows storing and retrieving huge amounts of data, distributed among a number of 
heterogeneous server systems. These systems simulate a single virtual file system. Depending 
on the Persistency Model, dCache provides methods for exchanging data with backend (tertiary) 
Storage Systems as well as space management, pool attraction, dataset replication, hot spot 
determination and recovery from disk or node failures. Connected to a tertiary storage system, 
the cache simulates unlimited direct access storage space. Data exchanges to and from the 
underlying hierarchical storage manager (HSM) are performed automatically and invisibly to the 
user. File system namespace operations may be performed through a standard NFS interface 
allowing all regular file system operations except accessing the data directly. In addition to 
standard data access methods like FTP, GridFTP, and http, the native access protocol dCap may 
be used allowing POSIX file system operations. dCache has full control of the location and 
multiplicity of datasets. Non-precious files are removed if space is running short. File replicas are 
generated if a certain pool becomes overloaded. Replicas are slowly removed if the situation 
improves. Pools are chosen for file transfers, either from clients or from the backend HSM, based 
on dynamic space and load parameters of the individual pools. In addition to the dynamic 
behavior, pools can be assigned to data according to the IP address of the client, the ordering 
mechanism of the backend HSM or special tags which can be given to subdirectory trees of the 
file space. For a detailed description of the scope of the dCache project see 
http://www.dcache.org. For more information on installation, configuration, administration and 
security considerations there is a dCache guide, “dCache, the book”, available (see: 
http://www.dcache.org/manuals/Book/). 
 
Because dCache can be used in a local environment as well as over a Wide Area Network, 
firewall issues have to be considered as well. If components of the dCache system are distributed 
across multiples sites, some of these components have to be accessed from outside, which 
implies that firewalls have to be traversed. Protocols used by dCache are dCap, GSIdCap, 
GridFTP and SRM (storage resource manager).  
 
dCap should be used only for local, trusted access; therefore it is not of any relevance for firewall 
considerations. GSIdCap extends the dCap protocol by using a GSI authentication wrapper 
(tunnel). Communicating with the GSIdCap servers (door nodes) requires opening certain ports 
into a firewall. 
 
The GridFTP protocol will be described in a following chapter. 
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The SRM protocol uses https as transport protocol and negotiates data transfers between the 
client and server as well as between different servers. One of the other already mentioned 
protocols is used for the actual data transfer. 
 
A common solution to overcome the problem of dynamic client and server connections over ports 
not known in advance is to open a range of ports within the firewall. From the user’s perspective 
this allows undisturbed usage of dCache services. From the firewall manager’s perspective it 
implies a security hole within the security policies of the site.    
 
Figure 3: dCache, an overview, Nicolo Fioretti, Bari , Nov. 2005, 
http://www.dcache.org/manuals/dcache.nicolo.overview.small.jpg 
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3.2.3 Issues in enabling General Parallel File System, GPFS 
Organization: Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, Jülich, Germany 
The General Parallel File System, GPFS, developed by IBM, is a high-performance shared-disk 
file system. It provides fast, reliable data access from all nodes in a homogenous or 
heterogeneous cluster running AIX or LINUX operating systems.  
 
GPFS allows parallel applications to simultaneously access one file or a set of files from any node 
that has mounted the GPFS file system while providing a high level of control over all file system 
operations. GPFS has been designed to deliver high performance, scalability and failure recovery 
by accessing multiple file system nodes in parallel. Nevertheless it complies with normal UNIX file 
system standards. GPFS provides high-performance I/O by "striping" blocks of data from 
individual files across multiple disks (on multiple storage devices) and reading/writing these 
blocks in parallel. In addition, GPFS can read or write large blocks of data in a single I/O 
operation, thereby minimizing overhead. For optimal performance and reliability the data can flow 
between the storage and the application node via multiple paths. GPFS availability is further 
improved by automatic logging and replication. Additionally GPFS can be configured to failover 
automatically in the event of disk or server malfunctions. GPFS scalability and performance are 
designed to meet the needs of data-intensive applications such as engineering design, digital 
media, data mining, financial analysis, seismic data processing and scientific research (see also 
the IBM GPFSflyer072606 “General Parallel File System” from July 2006 at http://www-
03.ibm.com/servers/eserver/clusters/software/gpfs.html). 
 
The general communication scheme used by GPFS is a client server model. The GPFS daemon 
(mmfsd process) communicates between nodes in different clusters. The communication paths 
are established via TCP socket call. GPFS uses IANA assigned port 1191 by default, which is 
changeable via the mmchconfig command if required. So from a firewall perspective GPFS uses 
only one port. This can be configured without any problems in standard firewalls. Because 
systems using GPFS are known in advance, a static access list can be configured. In future 
problems could arise if GPFS becomes publicly available and commonly used. In this case the 
protocol itself would have to be analyzed and secured, so that no backdoors or vulnerabilities 
could open holes within normally strongly protected network areas. 
 
What makes GPFS interesting as a special firewall use case is its very high communication 
throughput. Because of parallel streams transferring a file between systems, high bandwidth is 
needed. Communication throughput is only dependent on the number of clients and I/O servers 
employed within the GPFS installation. Data rates of 3 GB/s have already been experienced. This 
implies the usage of high-speed firewalls, not yet available today, or a very good load balancing 
of firewall clusters. 
 
3.3 System Deployment 
3.3.1 The Issue with the “Net of Trust” and the “Bastion hosts” solution 
Organization: Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, Jülich, Germany 
The Research Center Jülich has been involved in many networking projects over the last 10 
years. These projects always included research on new network technologies as well as their 
impact on applications. As a consequence firewall considerations have always been of main 
interest.  
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We realized that constantly growing network bandwidth demands require a reconsideration of the 
underlying techniques. New generation networking in Wide Area Networks implies the 
communication between hosts between different administrative security domains. Because of the 
high-speed network requirements, it is not possible to inspect every packet. Moreover firewalls 
cannot be faster than normal network interfaces (as they use these interfaces), so there will 
always be a time delay in implementing faster firewalls. Because firewalls have to forward many 
communication streams in parallel providing access for many different host-to-host 
communications, this scenario increases the needed throughput bandwidth enormously. 
Therefore traditional firewalls cannot be used in futuristic scenarios. How can security issues be 
handled in the future?  
 
Figure 1: Securing project networks – “Net of Trust” 
A generally used approach is to deploy a “Net of Trust”, which implies every node within the 
project network is assumed to be secure (or conforms to the security policies of all organizations). 
This can be achieved by having each node secured by an organization firewall (site local firewall) 
prohibiting unauthorized access from remote sites and assuming that only authorized persons 
can access the project network directly. Hosts A3, B3, C3 and D3 are connected to their 
institution networks and additionally to the project network. The project network cannot be 
accessed directly from outside (see Figure 1 above). 
 
Alternatively each node within the project network can be installed with the highest security 
considerations (host firewall, iptables, virus scanners, only essential services installed and 
activated with minimum privileges, etc.).  
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Figure 2: Securing project networks – “Bastion hosts” 
 
These hosts are normally called bastion hosts, because they are located in an insecure 
environment and have been secured as a bastion against their enemies. Figure 2 shows the 
bastion host scenario, where hosts A3, B3, C3 and D3 are connected to their institution network 
as well as to the publicly accessible project network. All hosts within the project network have to 
be secured accordingly. Though these scenarios are a nightmare for firewall administrators and 
security officers they are often used because of missing alternatives. New ideas have to be 
developed in the future. 
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3.3.2 The workflow management system TENT 
Organization: German Aerospace Centre, Cologne, Germany 
The workflow management system TENT (see figure 4 for a screenshot) has been developed at 
the German Aerospace Center over the last few years. It allows engineers to easily setup and to 
maintain workflows. Workflows are applications coupled together to form a process chain. 
Applications can be computational fluid dynamic (CFD) codes or graphical editors for 
visualization. Components can be numerical or functional units within a workflow, e.g. 
computational fluid dynamic (CFD) codes, graphical editors for visualization, or pre-/post-
processors. 
 
 
Figure 4: TENT GUI 
 
This process chain can be used to solve fluid dynamics, structural mechanics, and 
thermodynamic computations. Components are the smallest elements in a workflow and can be 
localized on distributed resources. Computational resources can be placed on different remote 
hosts. Coupling of resources can be achieved by means of Grid computing. By creating Virtual 
Organizations (VOs) it is possible to use all these resources as one. The following functionalities 
are necessary to use TENT within Grids: 
• Access to all resources of a Grid. Authentication mechanisms need to be provided. 
• Data transfers between the resources of a Grid must be possible. Data transfers can 
either be Reliable File Transfers (RFT) or status messages (MPI based messaging). 
• Execution of CFD codes on Grid resources. Job Managers and their queues should be 
accessible to the TENT system. 
 
For all these communications TENT uses service-based communication. 
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Figure 5: Closer look at possible firewall borders 
 
The creation of VOs becomes obligatory when applications (and their matching licenses) and 
resources are located on either sides of a firewall. The creation of VOs can extend beyond the 
borders of companies. Therefore the location of the Grid resources is no longer bound to 
geographical positions. Figure 5 gives a closer picture of the borders of a company. Firewalls 
form the borders of the local site. But some applications and resources, like high performance 
cluster, are often not located within the local (and easily accessible) network. 
 
Due to the fact that most companies and organizations use firewalls, the following problems may 
arise: 
• Several firewalls have to be passed (internally and externally). The administrators of 
these firewalls are not always directly available. 
• Firewalls have to be opened for several TCP and UDP ports. Some port ranges are 
unknown during set-up. They will be initialized by the Grid middleware itself. 
Consequently port ranges have to de defined. 
• Data transfers have to be allowed beyond the borders of a local site. This includes the 
transmission of data packets and status information. 
• VPNs have to be initialized at the borders of a site. To increase security the connections 
should be secured against wire-tapping.  
 
Security policies refuse opening of firewalls in almost every case. Strict control of the incoming 
and outgoing traffic becomes a major issue. A lot of politics have to be dealt with when 
establishing connections beyond company’s borders. 
 
3.3.3 AccessGrid1 
The Access Grid (see: “Welcome to AccessGrid.org” by Tom Uram, April, 20th, 2006, 
http://www.accessgrid.org/node/1) is a group collaboration system that provides resources as 
multimedia large-format displays, video conferencing systems, presentation and interactive 
environments, and interfaces to Grid middleware and to visualization environments, to allow 
group-to-group communication via the Internet. The Access Grid can be used for large-scale 
distributed meetings, collaborative work sessions, seminars, lectures, tutorials, and training. 
                                                      
1 There is a concern that AccessGrid does not follow the traditional Grid Computing model, but the reason to 
include this case within this document is to address issues around use of multicast with firewalls. 
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Therefore it differs from desktop-to-desktop tools that allow only communications between 
individuals. The software is well accepted by the Grid community and widely used all over the 
world. So called Access Grid nodes are equipped with high-end audio and visual technology. 
Nevertheless, individual desktop users may participate in Access Grid communications too by 
installing software on the local host which provides one-to-many and one-to-one 
communications. 
Access Grid users meet at virtual meeting spaces, which may be open to all or restricted to 
individual users. Each user connects to the Access Grid as an individual node, which may 
contain a desktop with a Quick Camera only or a highly equipped video conference room. 
Communication is established using multicast and consists of a number of independent parallel 
connections. This makes the overall communication stream difficult to manage within firewalls. 
Many firewalls do not allow or understand multicast traffic, which requires handling this 
application differently than others. Often, multicast traffic is bypassed or tunnelled through local 
firewalls, allowing only multicast addresses to use this “security shortcut”. Often this leads to 
conflicts with the existing institution’s network security policy and therefore requires 
management procedures to allow manual interaction/configuration on demand or general 
changes of security policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Example Access Grid conference 
Access Grid communications include a number of different software tools for which firewall 
configuration have to be adjusted. Software tools include the Access Grid client software, 
inSORS IG client software, VIC/IG Video and RAT/IG Audio tools, Jabber client, tkMoo MUD 
(Multiple User Dimensions) client software and server software as IG PIX, VNC, DPPT 
(Distributed PPT). If you are using a client machine only, you can use a Multicast-Unicast 
bridge, where the client connects to the bridged video and audio ports. This allows avoiding 
multicast streams within Access Grid communications. A detailed discussion on 
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communication streams initiated and ports used by Access Grid can be found at the Access 
Grid home page (see: “Access Grid Port Usage” by Javier Gomez Alonso, Univ. of 
Manchester, http://www.accessgrid.org/agdp/guide/ports/1.03/index.html). 
3.3.4 Firewalls and high bandwidth, long distance networks 
Organization: University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Grid applications often use high-bandwidth connections between grid locations over long 
distances. These applications will benefit from congestion-free connections. A modified TCP 
protocol behavior, which increases the rate of transmissions more rapidly after a congestion 
event, is needed to efficiently use such a connection. Such behavior makes these TCP streams 
unsuitable to share bandwidth with regular TCP streams, as they are considered to be unfair. 
These TCP streams therefore typically by-pass the regular Internet using dedicated, mostly 
optical-, connections between grid locations. Research within the GHPN-RG is performed to 
create on-demand version of these connections, using switched optical network technologies.  
The GHPN group does not consider the involved network security architectures.  
 
This section considers the requirements towards a possible security architecture that could be 
used to connect a grid node both to the Internet and to a long distance by-pass network. 
 
The figure below shows a possible network layout involving firewalls. All Grid resources are 
located behind a typical two-firewall setup with a DMZ. Firewalls A and D have an additional 
network interface that connects to the high bandwidth connection. Involving Grid middleware, a 
grid application may schedule a connection via the Multi-domain control and management plane. 
A Grid VO may be involved in the decision to provision the connection. 
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Figure 12: Possible network layout with a typical two firewall-setup with a DMZ 
 
Consider a network architecture as above, the following requirements and issues can be defined: 
1. The grid location must be protected against malicious attacks from the Internet. This is a 
general requirement for any node connected to the Internet. 
2. The Internet must be protected from abusive use from a Grid cluster. As Grid locations are 
capable of generating vast amounts of IP traffic, it has the potential to attract malicious users. 
If access control fails, then a firewall should stop any attempt to misdirect IP traffic.  
3. Memory shortage in any forwarding device will cause packet-loss. At least the performance of 
firewalls A and D must allow wire-speed operation without any congestion. Both firewalls 
must have enough memory to support the bandwidth delay product for each by-pass 
connection. Note that long distance connections inherently have large bandwidth-delay 
products.  
4. Firewall architectures must be capable of splitting the high-bandwidth inter-grid location traffic 
from the regular traffic at a very early stage, e.g. at firewalls A and D. This will avoid high 
network loads at shared network resources downstream.  
5. Adding nodes to a grid cluster should scale with the firewall infrastructure, such that 
congestion for Grid TCP streams, and unfairness to regular Internet resources, is avoided.  
6. Usage of on-demand network resources between two Grid locations may need authorization. 
Firewalls A and D may act as an ingress/egress point of such a connection. Firewalls A and D 
could therefore act as an access enforcement point. Firewall A or D could act as a first point 
of contact to which applications could send requests to open up a chain of firewalls.  
7. Firewalls A and D should enforce that only private (non-routable) addresses can be used via 
the by-pass connection. Routable addresses should be forwarded via the DMZ to firewalls B 
and C. Some address management for the private address spaces must be performed.  
8. Both, the Grid VO (or users authorized by the Grid VO) and network security administrator 
should have a stake in the control of the firewalls A and D.  
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4 Classification of Firewall Issues 
Given that: 
• Chapter 4 presented several kinds of grid applications, showing the issues arising when 
firewalls are located within the communication path.  
 
• Appendix A describes the issues of each specific application in a more structured way, 
defining the following classes of problems: 
 
o Software 
o Hardware 
o Network 
o Security policy 
 
This chapter will recognize two categories of firewall issues and further subdivide them 
accordingly. Issues are either caused by: 
 
1. The fact that the application is unaware of the network. 
2. The fact that the network is unaware of the application. 
 
The classification is made based on the assumption that both the network and the application 
may not be aware of each other in terms of requirements. Typically, the application assumes 
network transparency. However, the application also expects secure and reliability operation and 
therefore expects to be protected against malicious intends.  Both expectations require some 
understanding between the application and the network. We therefore approach the classification 
from the above listed observations. At this point we do not seek solutions for these issues, we 
sometimes only hint towards them. Presenting existing and new solutions will be covered in (a) 
separate document(s). 
 
4.1 Issues caused by the application having difficulties to be aware of network needs 
This is an issue were applications try to adapt towards the needs of the network. This paragraph 
tries to map each firewall issue as identified in chapter 4 in one of the following four categories: 
software, hardware, network, security policy. 
4.1.1 Software and port numbers 
 
Port numbers and number of ports are unknown until the application starts. The consequence is 
that firewall administrators need to create big holes (up to 10.000 ports) if the application is not 
capable of determining the amount of ports to be used and/or the port numbers are unknown. 
Trying to push all traffic though a single hole (e.g. HTTP port 80) causes referral problems. In 
general, only specific, predetermined applications that use a low number of very well-defined 
ports (or “well-known ports”) can be supported adequately. 
 
4.1.2 Hardware 
Applications that want to be aware of the underlying network have difficulties with: 
• Understanding the number and kind of firewalls located within the routing path. 
• Pushing high performance data streams across long connections that need enough buffer 
space and switching capacity. If applications were aware of buffer sizes and delays, they 
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could adjust their transmission rates more effectively to avoid packet drops in any kind of 
forwarding device, including firewalls. 
• Opening multiple high performance channels (wavelengths) over a single fiber. There are no 
firewalls that are able to deal with multiple wavelengths on a single fiber. If these wavelengths 
have been divided into individual fibers by DWDM equipment, firewalls are not able to deal 
with 16, 32 or 64 links of 10 Gb/s each currently. Current firewalls can deal with up to 5 Gb/s 
links, and, if they act as packet filters only, may handle multiple 10 Gb/s links, but they are not 
able to deal with several hundred Gb/s coming in through multiple 10 Gb/s interfaces. Though 
load balancing firewalls are available since some time, these cannot handle such high 
communication streams.  
 
4.1.3 Network 
Applications are typically unaware of their position within the network. This may cause issues like: 
• Certain grid applications cannot be placed inside the DMZ. This, as the data contained within 
such application may be too sensitive to allow it to be compromised and therefore can only be 
placed within the enterprise network. The application will need to be changed such that it 
temporally publishes relevant pieces of the information from its location on the enterprise side 
of the firewall to a server reachable via the DMZ. 
• Grid applications are more and more developed using a SOA. Such architecture is inherently 
distributed. If a workflow orchestrates components located at various places, the interfaces 
may need to cross multiple firewalls and DMZs, each with their own security and firewall 
policies. The more a workflow is allowed to be flexible, the more security policy issues are 
likely.   
• Applications are built independently of their network addresses, but rather have things like 
URLs to identify them. Applications with a need for special network resources, that bypass 
the regular Internet, must somehow indicate this. Therefore, firewalls involved in bypass 
connections also may need to perform elaborate routing functions, 
 
4.1.4 Security Policy 
In terms of security the application may need to communicate certain needs to the network. This 
causes typically issues like: 
 
• Firewalls may not have enough information to authorize complex grid applications. 
• Firewalls must not only protect against attacks from the public network, but also prevent the 
public network from being abused where the application does not provide enough information 
to distinguish between “good” and “bad”. 
• Applications need to trust each other and firewalls may not be able to extend the security 
context between two applications. 
• Applications cannot provide firewalls with enough information so that firewalls may therefore 
not be aware if a host connecting is actually trusted. 
 
4.2 Issues caused by the network being unable to be aware of the application 
 
These issues are cause by problems where the network tries to adapt towards the need of an 
application. This is the traditional approach where the application expects the network to be 
transparent and the issue is therefore the network. 
One may subdivide these issues into 5 kinds, with an increasing amount of difficulty to be 
resolved: 
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4.2.1 Applications that use only well–known TCP/UDP ports 
 
These specific ports could be easily opened within a firewall and they should not represent any 
problem for a firewall administrator. Nevertheless, each of these applications has to be examined 
in detail, to verify whether the communication protocol complies with the security policy of the 
local organization. For example, ssh should be no problem, because users will always be 
authenticated and authorized by the local ssh server. The same would be true for telnet, but 
telnet uses an unencrypted authentication scheme, sending userids and passwords in cleartext 
over the communication path. If a telnet session is recorded by an unauthorized person (hacker), 
he has now gained access to sensitive information that may afterwards be used to get 
unauthorized access to resources that shouldn’t be publicly available. So each grid application, 
although using only single and fixed ports, has to be checked for compliance with the 
organizational security policies. 
Some applications extend the use of single well-known ports by tunneling messages through 
them e.g. port 80 (http). These implementations have been developed to circumvent institutional 
security policies exploiting the fact most organizations allow the use of the http protocol. Though 
this method would allow any kind of firewall traversal, it has been shown that, as a general 
concept, would also allow hackers and especially viruses to overcome firewall barriers. Firewall 
developers have taken application tunneling into account and have developed countermeasures 
against these bad-practices. They have implemented software that is familiar with a set of 
standard protocols, e.g. http, making a trivial port tunneling to be recognized and stopped. This 
remedy does not completely solve the problem, because the tunneling application can be 
programmed to behave like a standard protocol stream, but it helps in recognizing most of the 
trivial tunnel-attacks from the outside. Taking into account these considerations, application 
programmers should avoid making use of these kinds of tunneling techniques. 
4.2.2 Detectable dynamic data transfer ports 
Applications that use a single well-known port for a control channel and a set of dynamic ports for 
the data transfer. The control channel (typically in clear-text) is used to synchronize the 
communication behavior between client and server applications, e.g. to exchange information 
about the dynamic ports that will be allocated for file transfers (data stream of an ftp session). 
The control streams can be constantly monitored by special firewall plug-ins that extracts the set 
of ports dynamically allocated for the data streams. These ports are then automatically opened in 
the firewall. Such a mechanism has been already developed for the FTP, H.323 and SIP 
protocols. 
4.2.3 Obscured dynamic data transfer ports  
Applications similar to those described in bullet 2, but where the information exchanged in the 
control channel is not sufficient to determine the set of dynamic ports that will be used for data 
transfer. This may happen because the control channel is encrypted (thus the firewall plug-in 
cannot access its content) or because the set of dynamic ports is generated internally by the 
application after the control channel has been closed (e.g. GridFTP 3rd party transfer). In both 
cases the applications require a complete range of ephemeral ports to be permanently allowed 
for traversing through the firewall. Most likely, firewall administrators do not like such a 
configuration. 
4.2.4 Arbitrarily dynamic data transfer ports 
Applications that change on-the-fly the total amount of dynamic ports they use. These 
applications may start a data transfer using one ephemeral port or a set of ephemeral ports, then 
they may add or remove sockets arbitrarily at any time (i.e. GridFTP 3rd party transfer).  
The difficulty in determining the complete communication setup at starting time implies that a 
complete range of ephemeral ports need to be permanently allowed for traversing through the 
firewall. Most likely, firewall administrators do not like such a configuration. 
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4.2.5 High throughput data pipes with non standard traffic patterns 
Applications that require high throughput data pipes. These data streams often have special 
SLAs (Service Level Agreements) that make them unsuitable to share communication links with 
normal traffic. These SLAs could result in unfair behavior of the streams, leading to reduced 
throughput for normal traffic. In some cases normal traffic could drop to zero because of the 
excessive use of these grid applications.  
As a solution it should be feasible to route the special traffic on dedicated connections, bypassing 
the normal institutional firewall, while yet ensuring full compliance with the security policies (high 
throughput traffic has to be secured in a different manner). 
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5 Future directions 
Firewalls aim at securing and controlling the traffic flowing in and out of an organizational domain. 
The importance of their role in the enforcement of security policies is not under discussion. On 
the other hand, free research and information exchange between organizational entities is 
required as well.  
Application programmers did not deal with firewalls in the past. Applications were often 
developed, debugged and validated in a local environment without interaction with firewalls. After 
successful implementation they have been thought to be deployed in a more global environment, 
often extending over different organizational entities. In this way applications and firewalls came 
to interact with each other, establishing a relationship not always easy and flawless. The 
examples gathered in this document have the purpose to give programmers useful insights for 
developing firewall-aware applications, increasing their awareness of the distributed nature of 
resources of a grid environment. 
Another line of investigation should pave the way for firewall developers to produce new kinds of 
firewalls, which can cope with new types of applications and network infrastructures. Constantly 
growing bandwidth demands require reconsideration of the underlying technologies. Firewalls 
cannot be faster than network interfaces since they are based on these interfaces; there will 
always be a delay in implementing faster firewalls. New concepts have to be developed: for 
example instead of inspecting single packets streams could be checked. This is already offered 
by current firewalls through the port concept. Many connections will be allowed without checking 
their actual content. The connections will be allowed because another entity, the destination 
system, already verified the authorization credentials. 
Firewall vendors should also get involved in accomplishing strategic and long-term objectives, as 
the definition of a standardized authentication/authorization mechanism to be implemented in 
their systems. Such a protocol would allow grid-enabled firewalls to become a reality. 
 
 
6 Summary 
This document starts with an introduction of the fundamentals about firewalls and other devices, 
like network address translators, application level gateways and VPN gateways, used to protect 
applications and infrastructure from malicious attacks from the Internet.  
The next section gives an overview of some commonly deployed grid applications and the issues 
they face when dealing with firewalls. It is not intended to include all possible applications used in 
grid environments, but just to identify and describe a set of representative examples. These 
applications were classified according to their communication behavior, to get a good description 
of the problems arising because of the existence of firewalls within the communication paths. To 
perform an objective analysis of the firewall issues, based exclusively on homogeneous 
parameters, the chosen applications were described according to a template that accommodates 
four categories of problems/risks: software, hardware, network, and security policy. The complete 
set of descriptions is available in Appendix 1. 
The last part of the document focuses on the identification of regular patterns among the firewall 
issues. Most often problems arise because of the large number of ports used by the applications 
or because of the impossibility to determine all these ports in advance. Other common 
shortcomings are caused by hardware limitations or by specific network configurations, like the 
deployment of grid services in the DMZ. 
The OGF Firewall Issues Research Group (FI-RG) intends to create another document as a 
follow-up to this one, which will introduce possible approaches to solve (or mitigate) the problems 
identified so far. 
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7 Security Considerations 
This entire document is about security considerations.  
It describes grid applications used across firewalls, tries to identify security risks and organizes 
these risks into use cases. The document is intended to provide an overview of scenarios not yet 
supported by current firewall systems and aim at identifying solutions for future developments. 
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10 Glossary 
 
ALG Application Level Gateway, see chapter 3.3 
dCAP 
dCache native protocol providing access to dataset contents and supporting 
regular file access functionality. The dCache software package includes a C-
language client implementation of this protocol offering the POSIX file I/O 
operations as well as the standard file system namespace operations. 
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DMZ 
Demilitarized Zone. DMZ is a firewall configuration for securing local area 
networks (LANs). In a DMZ configuration, most computers on the LAN run 
behind a firewall connected to a public network like the Internet. One or more 
computers also run outside the firewall, in the DMZ. Those computers on the 
outside intercept traffic and broker requests for the rest of the LAN, adding 
an extra layer of protection for computers behind the firewall. Traditional 
DMZs allow computers behind the firewall to initiate requests outbound to the 
DMZ. Computers in the DMZ in turn respond, forward or re-issue requests 
out to the Internet or other public networks. The LAN firewall, though, 
prevents computers in the DMZ from initiating inbound requests.  
DWDM 
Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing is a fiber-optic transmission 
technique that employs light wavelengths to transmit data parallel-by-bit or 
serial-by-character. 
GPFS 
General Parallel File System, developed by IBM, is a high-performance 
shared-disk file system. It provides fast, reliable data access from all nodes 
in a homogenous or heterogeneous cluster running AIX or LINUX operating 
systems. 
GridFTP 
Special FTP protocol for Grids, see chapter 4.2.2 
 
GSI 
Grid Security Infrastructure, the basis for Globus Toolkit Security layer. 
 
GSIdCap 
Extension of the dCap protocol using GSI authentication wrapper (tunnel). 
Communicating with the GSIdCap servers (door nodes) requires opening 
ports into a firewall. 
HSM 
Hierarchical Storage Manager is policy-based management of file backup 
and archiving in a way that uses storage devices economically and without 
the user needing to be aware of when files are being retrieved from backup 
storage media. Although HSM can be implemented on a standalone system, 
it is more frequently used in the distributed network of an enterprise. The 
hierarchy represents different types of storage media, such as redundant 
array of independent disks systems, optical storage, or tape, each type 
representing a different level of cost and speed of retrieval when access is 
needed. 
H.323 
H.323 is an umbrella recommendation from the ITU-T that defines the 
protocols to provide audio-visual communication sessions on any packet-
switched network. 
IDB Incarnation Database  
IPSec  
IP Security, a set of protocols developed by the IETF to support secure 
exchange of packets at the IP layer. IPsec has been deployed widely to 
implement Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). 
MAC 
Medium Access Control. This protocol is used to provide the data link layer 
of the Ethernet LAN system. 
MPI 
Message Passing Interface. MPI is a library specification for message-
passing, proposed as a standard by a broadly based committee of vendors, 
implementers, and users. 
NAT Network Address Translation, see chapter 3.3 
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NAPT Network Address Port Translation, see chapter 3.3 
NJS 
Network Job Supervisor. The NJS is the Unicore front-end to a target batch 
system. It is responsible to map the abstract job description to concrete 
target system instances.  
PAT Port Address Translation, see chapter 3.3 
RFT 
Reliable File Transfer. It is an OGSA-based service that provides interfaces 
for controlling and monitoring third-party file transfers using GridFTP servers. 
The client controlling the transfer is hosted inside of a Grid service so it can 
be managed using the soft state model and queried using the ServiceData 
interfaces available to all Grid services. 
SIP  
Session Initiation Protocol. It is an application-layer control protocol that can 
establish, modify, and terminate multimedia sessions such as Internet 
telephony calls (VoIP). SIP can also invite participants to already existing 
sessions, as in multicast conferences. Media can be added to (and removed 
from) an existing session. SIP transparently supports name mapping and 
redirection services, which supports personal mobility - users can maintain a 
single externally visible identifier regardless of their network location. See 
also RFC 3261, 3262, 3263, 3264, and 3265. 
SLA 
Service Level Agreement. It is a formal contract between a carrier and a 
customer that defines the terms of the carrier's responsibility to the customer 
and the type and extent of remuneration if those responsibilities are not met. 
These agreements can handle e.g. latencies, packet loss, cable damage etc. 
SOAP 
Simple Object Access Protocol. It is a lightweight protocol intended for 
exchanging structured information in a decentralized, distributed 
environment. It is an XML based protocol that consists of three parts: an 
envelope that defines a framework for describing what is in a message and 
how to process it, a set of encoding rules for expressing instances of 
application-defined datatypes, and a convention for representing remote 
procedure calls and responses. 
SOCKS  
Socks is a protocol for secure sessions traversal across firewall. It provides a 
framework for client-server applications in both the TCP and UDP domains to 
conveniently and securely use the services of a network firewall. See RFC 
1928. 
SRM 
Storage Resource Manager. This protocol uses HTTPS as transport protocol 
and negotiates data transfers between clients and servers as well as 
between different servers.  
SSL 
Secure Socket Layer is an encryption standard that prevents anyone from 
intercepting and reading the data streams between the clients and servers 
TSI 
Target System Interface. It is a library of Perl modules being installed on the 
target system (e.g. the supercomputer) 
TTL 
Time-to-live. It is a value in an Internet Protocol packet that tells a network 
router whether or not the packet has been in the network too long and should 
be discarded. For a number of reasons, packets may not get delivered to 
their destination in a reasonable length of time. A solution is to discard the 
packet after a certain time and send a message to the originator, who can 
decide whether to resend the packet. 
VLAN Virtual LAN. It is a group of PCs, servers and other network resources that behave as if they were connected to a single, network segment — even 
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though they may not be. The resources and servers of other users in the co-
location facility will be invisible to each of the other VLAN members. 
VPN 
Virtual Private Network. It is a private network that is configured within a 
public network (a carrier's network or the Internet). VPNs are widely used by 
enterprises to create wide area networks that span large geographic areas, 
to provide site-to-site connections to branch offices and to allow mobile users 
to dial up their company LANs. 
XML  
Extensible Markup Language. It is a simple dialect of Standard Generalized 
Markup Language (SGML). Its goal is to enable generic SGML to be served, 
received, and processed on the Web in the way that is now possible with 
HTML. XML has been designed for ease of implementation and for 
interoperability with both SGML and HTML. 
X.509 X.509 is a widely used standard for digital certificates. 
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11 Appendix 1: Classification of firewall issues seen from the use cases side 
 
 
Name The “Net of Trust Model” 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
Hosts within a project network spanning different organizational entities are secured via institutional 
firewalls. Between the project hosts no firewall is used. Each host and the users of these hosts are 
assumed trustworthy. 
Advantage and problem solved: Because of private networks, firewalls do not introduce a throughput 
bottleneck (10 Gb/s and more connections may be used)  
 
Elements in 
communi-
cation path 
Software Hardware Network Security Policy 
Se
ve
rit
y  Low low low High 
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e  NA NA management management 
O
w
n 
So
ftw
ar
e Any kind of 
software can be 
used. 
Commercial, free 
software as well 
as experimental 
software. 
Po
rt
s 
us
ed
 
Because of no 
restriction, every 
port/port range 
may be used. 
 No elements 
within 
communi-
cation path. 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 u
se
d 
All kinds of 
protocols 
beneath TCP 
and UDP 
possible 
No hardware 
restrictions. 
Because of 
free 
communication 
paths every 
kind of 
hardware 
using any kind 
of protocols 
(also non IP) 
may be used. 
The network 
connecting the 
hosts is a 
private one. 
Could be IP or 
lower 
protocols.  
The security policy on 
both sides has to 
agree with this net of 
trust concept. 
Hacking of one 
project host leads to 
security impacts on 
all connected 
institutional local 
networks.  
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Name The “Bastion Host Model” 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
Hosts within a project network spanning different organizational entities are secured only by their own 
security mechanisms (host firewalls). The project hosts are freely accessible from the outside world. 
The project network security concept is based on the security of each individual host (bastion host). 
 
Elements in 
communi-
cation path 
Software Hardware Network Security Policy 
Se
ve
rit
y  Low low low High 
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e  NA NA management management 
O
w
n 
So
ftw
ar
e 
Any software 
can be used 
assumed this 
software 
packet is 
secure and 
does not 
introduce any 
vulnerability.  
Po
rt
s 
us
ed
 
Because of no 
restriction, 
every port/port 
range may be 
used. 
 No elements 
within 
communi-
cation path. 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 u
se
d 
All kinds of 
protocols 
beneath TCP 
and UDP 
possible 
No hardware 
restrictions. 
Because of 
free 
communication 
paths every 
kind of 
hardware 
using any kind 
of protocols 
(also non IP) 
may be used. 
Prerequisite: 
Host can be 
configured 
secure 
(whatever this 
means). 
The network 
connecting the 
hosts is an 
official one. 
Could be IP or 
lower 
protocols.  
The bastion hosts are 
placed outside the 
institution networks. 
This implies that these 
networks are not 
affected. Nevertheless, 
connections from the 
bastion hosts into the 
institution network are 
normally required. 
These communications 
have to be inspected 
and secured. Hacking of 
a project host does not 
directly lead to security 
impacts on the other 
project hosts. Every 
host is a standalone 
bastion.  
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Name Access Grid 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
The Access Grid is a group collaboration system that provides resources as multimedia 
large-format displays, presentation and interactive environments, and interfaces to 
Grid middleware and to visualization environments, to allow group-to-group 
collaboration via the Internet. The Access Grid can be used for large-scale distributed 
meetings, collaborative work sessions, seminars, lectures, tutorials, and training. Well 
accepted software within the Grid community and widely used all over the world.  
 
Elements in 
communi-
cation path 
Software Hardware Network Security Policy 
Se
ve
rit
y  Low Low high high 
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e  NA NA management management 
O
w
n 
So
ftw
ar
e 
No. Software 
toolkit 
developed by 
Argonne 
National Lab, 
ANL  
Po
rt
s 
us
ed
 
Incoming and 
Outgoing: 
many different 
fixed ports 
depending on 
used software 
components 
 Any kind of 
firewalls 
between the 
communi-
cating 
entities. 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 u
se
d 
Multicast 
Any kind of  
hardware as 
desktop 
systems, 
video 
equipment, 
… 
Allowing 
multicast, 
bypassing 
firewalls or 
configuring 
tunnels 
through 
firewalls. 
 
Often conflicting with 
the existing 
institution’s network 
security policy. 
Requires 
management 
procedures to allow 
manual 
interaction/configura
tion on demand or 
general changes of 
security policies 
(opening multicast 
traffic, tunnelling 
through firewalls or 
bypassing firewalls. 
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Name dCache 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n dCache allows storing and retrieving huge amounts of data, distributed among a number of 
heterogeneous server systems. These systems simulate a single virtual file system. 
 
Elements in 
communi-
cation path 
Software Hardware Network Security Policy 
Se
ve
rit
y  Low low middle High 
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e  NA NA management management 
O
w
n 
So
ftw
ar
e No. Software developed at DESA 
and FERMI.  
Po
rt
s 
us
ed
 
Incoming:  
dCap TCP 22125  
GSIdCap TCP 22128 
 GridFTP TCP 2811 
and 20000-25000 
SRM TCP 8443 
Location Manager 
TCP 11111 
Outgoing: any  
All ports are 
configurable 
 Any kind of 
firewalls 
between the 
communi-
cating 
entities. 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 u
se
d TCP 
No hardware 
restrictions.  
Different kinds 
of 
configuration 
allowed. Some 
components 
must/may be 
placed within a 
DMZ, some of 
them 
must/may be 
placed 
internally into 
the site 
network.  
Since most of the 
protocols use 
dynamic ports 
within a specified 
range, there have 
severe security 
impacts. If the 
protocols used 
haven’t been 
configured 
securely, 
backdoors may be 
introduced.  
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Name GPFS 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
The General Parallel File System is a high-performance shared-disk file system. It provides fast, 
reliable data from all nodes in a homogenous or heterogeneous cluster running an AIX or LINUX 
operating system.  
GPFS allows parallel applications simultaneous access to one file or a set of files from any node that 
has the GPFS file system mounted using parallel streams for a single file transfer.  
 
Elements in 
communi-
cation path 
Software Hardware Network Security Policy 
Se
ve
rit
y 
 Low low low Middle 
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e  NA NA NA management 
O
w
n 
So
ftw
ar
e No. Software 
developed by IBM.  
Po
rt
s 
us
ed
 GPFS TCP 1191  
Port is configurable 
 Any kind of 
firewalls 
between the 
communicating 
entities. 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 u
se
d TCP 
No hardware 
restrictions.  
Communicatio
n is done via 
normal 
communication 
paths.  
(Site network –  
provider 
network –  
site network).  
Protocol uses 
fixed 
configurable TCP 
port. 
Disadvantage: 
Communication 
including data is 
unencrypted.  
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Name The workflow management system TENT 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n This use case describes the firewall issues arise while integrating grid middleware software into the 
workflow management system TENT. The creation of a VO forms the major problem. 
 
Elements in 
communi-
cation path 
Software Hardware Network Security Policy 
Se
ve
rit
y 
 Low low middle High 
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e  NA NA management management 
O
w
n 
So
ftw
ar
e 
Yes (TENT) 
No (Globus 
Toolkit) 
Po
rt
s 
us
ed
 Unknown port range used 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 u
se
d TCP 
 Several packet 
filters located at 
the network 
borders of the 
participating 
organizations. 
Globus requires several 
ports to be opened for 
e.g. MyProxy Server, 
Web Service Container. 
GridFTP uses an 
unknown port range.  
The hardware 
on which the 
software runs 
are not located 
in DMZs. 
Solutions with 
VPNs would 
end in the 
DMZ. 
Resources of 
the Grid 
cannot be 
relocated. 
3 DMZs are 
located in the 
communication 
path.  
The security 
policy on both 
sides does not 
allow the opening 
of ports without 
inspection. 
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Name The Globus Toolkit 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n This use case describes the firewall issues that arise while using Globus Toolkit applications 
 
Elements in 
communi-
cation path 
Software Hardware Network Security Policy 
Se
ve
rit
y 
 Low low middle High 
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e  NA NA management management 
O
w
n 
So
ftw
ar
e No (Globus Toolkit) 
Po
rt
s 
us
ed
 
Unknown 
ports and 
known port 
ranges as 
well as 
known ports 
used 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 u
se
d TCP 
 Several 
packet filters 
located at the 
network 
borders of the 
participating 
organizations. 
Globus requires 
several ports to be 
opened for different 
services. To be 
highly parallel for 
some applications 
huge port ranges 
have to be opened  
Runs on 
different kinds 
of Grid 
resources. 
Runs on 
different kinds 
of Grid 
resources. 
Depending on 
the number of 
streams and 
the throughput 
desired using 
all kinds of 
Globus 
applications, 
the firewall 
hardware 
might be a 
performance 
bottleneck. 
The security 
policy on both 
sides does not 
allow the opening 
of ports without 
inspection. 
Huge port ranges 
may have to be 
opened 
dependent on 
services used. 
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Name GridFTP vs. the Firewall 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n GridFTP protocol specifics and the reason why firewalls are not able to deal with it well. 
 
Elements in 
communi-
cation path 
Software Hardware Network Security Policy 
Se
ve
rit
y 
 low low low High 
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e  NA NA NA management 
O
w
n 
So
ftw
ar
e Yes - GridFTP 
Po
rt
s 
us
ed
 Unknown numbers 
/ dynamically 
decided 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 u
se
d 
TCP 
 Unknown 
number of 
Packet 
filters/ 
stateful 
firewalls 
monitoring 
based on 5-
tuple of an 
IP packet 
Software requires multiple 
ports to run. 
Sockets/connections are 
added and deleted 
dynamically. Sockets 
determined dynamically 
per connection 
Runs on Grid 
resources. 
Grid resources 
cannot be 
placed in the 
DMZ 
Runs on Grid 
resources. 
Depending on 
the number of 
streams and 
the throughput 
desired using 
GridFTP, the 
firewall 
hardware 
might be a 
performance 
bottleneck. 
Requires static 
opening of a 
large number of 
ports (1000+ at 
least) in the 
dynamic port 
range all the time 
in Firewall. This 
leads to a big 
security hole that 
security and 
network 
administrators 
are challenged to 
endorse. 
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Name UNICORE 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
The UNICORE software (UNiform Interface to COmputing REsources) is a user-friendly software 
interface which allows easy and uniform access to distributed computing resources, and which 
provides support for running important scientific and engineering applications in a Grid environment. 
Scientists can use different supercomputers as well as other computing and storage resources without 
having to become experts in the special kind of access software and security policies of the various 
(super-)computer centers. 
 
Elements in 
communi-
cation path 
Software Hardware Network Security Policy 
Se
ve
rit
y 
 Low low low low 
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e 
 NA NA NA NA 
O
w
n 
So
ftw
ar
e Available via 
sourceforge.org  
Po
rt
s 
us
ed
 
One TCP port  
Port is configurable 
Depending on 
location of the NJS 
an additional port 
may be needed to 
be opened 
 Any kind of 
firewalls 
between the 
communi-
cating entities. 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 u
se
d 
TCP 
No hardware 
restrictions.  
Communication 
is done via 
normal 
communication 
paths.  
Unicore client 
program 
connects to 
Unicore 
gateway. This 
connects 
internally to the 
Network Job 
Supervisor 
service  
Protocol uses fixed 
configurable TCP 
port. 
Communication 
and access is 
allowed with 
certificates only. 
So there is only 
low security 
impact. 
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Name Firewalls and high bandwidth, long distance networks 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n This use-case describes a setup that allows the creation of (optical) by-pass connections that span 
long distances which need to be connected via a firewall 
 
Elements in 
communi-
cation path 
Software Hardware Network Security Policy 
Se
ve
rit
y 
 Low High middle High 
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e  NA performance management management 
O
w
n 
So
ftw
ar
e 
Yes and No 
GridFTP or 
any other 
datamover 
may be used – 
requirements 
are 
independent 
Po
rt
s 
us
ed
 
Globus port 
range or others 
 Enterprise and 
public firewalls 
at both ends of 
a connection. 
Enterprise 
firewall both 
connects to the 
DMZ and to an 
optical by-pass 
connection. 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 u
se
d 
TCP and UDP 
in various 
flavors 
Switching 
performance 
and buffer 
space is critical 
for the 
enterprise side 
of the firewall. 
Buffers should 
be able to 
contain the 
bandwidth/dela
y product of a 
long haul 
connection. 
Performance 
should be in 
the multi-Gb 
range. 
Enterprise 
firewall may be 
involved in 
driving the 
request of a 
by-pass 
connections 
when detecting 
private 
address space 
ARP requests 
or handling 
application 
specific signals 
using some 
protocol 
1. Requests from 
an application to 
access the optical 
by-pass should be 
authorized. The 
firewall should call 
out to obtain such 
authorizations or be 
provisioned with 
information that 
recognizes an 
access request. 
2. Security policies 
should prevent hi-
bandwidth / non-
TCP transmission 
protocol 
conformant traffic 
to be leaked into 
the regular Internet. 
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Name Web Services Firewall Issues 
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n Clients outside a network protected by a firewall must be able to refer to the Web Service End Point 
Reference (EPR) 
 
Elements in 
communi-
cation path 
Software Hardware Network Security Policy 
Se
ve
rit
y 
 High NA Low High 
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e  NA NA NA Management 
O
w
n 
So
ft-
w
ar
e 
External clients 
must know to refer 
to the SOAP-proxy 
in order to reach 
Web Service EPRs. 
Internal EPRs must 
be translated to 
external EPRs, in 
order to be reached 
through the SOAP-
proxy. 
Po
rt
s 
us
ed
 SOAP over HTTP 
(port 80). 
More than one Web 
Service may run on 
the same port. 
 The server’s 
network is 
protected by a 
firewall and a 
SOAP-proxy 
firewall in 
parallel, which 
acts as a 
gateway 
between 
external clients 
and WS 
Application 
Server. 
Any other kind 
of firewall may 
be located 
between the 
client and the 
server. 
Pr
ot
oc
ol
 u
se
d TCP 
Web Services 
are running on 
hosts located in 
the internal 
network. 
 
Firewalls in 
the 
communicati
on path may 
not allow 
direct 
connections. 
It is not possible 
to know how 
many Web 
Services are 
running on a 
single port. 
No way to 
express a policy 
that informs 
client to extend 
the security 
context end-to-
end when 
communicating 
through the 
SOAP-proxy. 
The SOAP-proxy 
must have the 
same or higher 
level of trust 
when EPRs are 
communicated to 
external clients. 
  There is no standard mechanism to  
• Augment an EPR with routing information 
• Obtain an external EPR from an internal EPR 
• Publish and discover external EPRs 
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12 Intellectual Property Statement 
The OGF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other 
rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be 
available; neither does it represent that it has made any effort to identify any such rights.  Copies 
of claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of licenses to be made 
available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of 
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the 
OGF Secretariat. 
The OGF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent 
applications, or other proprietary rights which may cover technology that may be required to 
practice this recommendation.  Please address the information to the OGF Executive Director. 
 
13 Disclaimer 
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an “As Is” basis and the OGF 
disclaims all warranties, express or implied, including but not limited to any warranty that the use 
of the information herein will not infringe any rights or any implied warranties of merchantability or 
fitness for a particular purpose. 
 
14 Full Copyright Notice 
Copyright © Open Grid Forum (2006). All Rights Reserved. 
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works 
that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, 
published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the 
above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. 
However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright 
notice or references to the OGF or other organizations, except as needed for the purpose of 
developing Grid Recommendations in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the 
OGF Document process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than 
English. 
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the OGF or its 
successors or assignees. 
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